Regular readers will be aware, and no doubt tired, of my long-running war with the RANZCP (abbreviations at end) over what model they use to guide their daily practice, their teaching and their research. This is fairly important, it's a bit like the map that tells you where to go, or the anatomy book that tells you where to cut, or the pathology book that tells you there is no safe level of lead for children, so those lead water pipes have to be replaced regardless.
In the US, psychiatrists don't need to talk about their model because they all agree it's perfect. The "biomedical model" says that all mental disorder is due to a physical disturbance of the brain, so they just get on with pouring money into basic brain research. Trouble is, nobody has ever seen their model [1], there's no reason to believe it can ever work [2], and it isn't working, as former NIMH Director Thomas Insel admitted [3]. In his 13 years as director, he said, they spent about $20billion on basic research but it had no effect on the lives of the mentally-troubled.
Other countries aren't quite so extreme. In the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, psychiatrists tell everybody they have a model that integrates mind, body and society, the "biopsychosocial (BPS) model." In a letter dated Nov 20th 2023, the president of RANZCP, Dr Elizabeth Moore, stated:
The BPS remains the predominant theoretical framework underpinning contemporary psychiatry and remains a relevant and useful component of training and practice ... The Board supports that respectful academic debate about the evidence for psychiatric treatment models is an appropriate way to discuss these matters.
If, as I pointed out to her, the RANZCP uses the biopsychosocial model in teaching and practice, they must have some teaching material to hand out, so could they be so kind as to send a copy of that material as it's a bit difficult to engage in "respectful academic debate" if the other side refuses to talk. No response. From that, I conclude that the RANZCP, and the UK Royal College of Psychiatrists, and the Canadians, don't have this model. It cannot "underpin contemporary psychiatry" as it is a fabrication. Philosopher Harry Frankfurt said telling a lie takes skill and determination:
Telling a lie is an act with a sharp focus. It is designed to insert a particular falsehood at a specific point in a set or system of beliefs, in order to avoid the consequences of having that point occupied by the truth. This requires a degree of craftsmanship... [4].
If the truth is: "We psychiatrists don't have a theoretical framework, so our training and practice take place in an intellectual vacuum. PS we'd still like all the power and to be paid as specialists, thanks," then the consequences would be hugely embarrassing, or worse. Far better to remove that sentence from the discourse and replace it with the bit of fluff the president sent: "The BPS remains the predominant theoretical framework underpinning contemporary psychiatry and remains a relevant and useful component of training and practice." This way, all those potentially nit-picky people in governments and funding agencies will think nice things of psychiatry, which they wouldn't think if they knew the truth.
The trouble is, lies mostly have a use-by date, and the falsehood of the BPS model is fast approaching the end of a long and successful run: "Oh dear, people are demanding copies of our teaching material and we don't actually have any. What can we do?" ... But wait. Academia to the rescue! In a five page editorial, Prof. Christopher Davey, of Melbourne, the new editor-in-chief of the RANZCP's main journal, Aust. NZ J Psychiatry, revisits the huge gap between the mental side of "mental disturbance" and what we know of the brain diseases that underlie that disturbance [5].
Depression, he suggested, can be seen as either an "...understandable response to the stresses and strains of contemporary life ... a psychological reaction to social events ...", or "...arising from aberrant brain processes... " In the first case, all that is required is social support while physical disturbances of the brain should be treated by the "medical model." Of course, that omits all the stuff that kept Freud busy, the intrapsychic conflict over the past, or moral or personality issues and so on, but it makes a tidy story. We need to close the "gap" between brain and mind, he said, and the way to do this is by statistical thermodynamics. The model we should embrace is the concept of "free energy" developed by a Prof. Karl Friston at University College London. Friston's website says:
Karl Friston is a theoretical neuroscientist and authority on brain imaging. He invented statistical parametric mapping (SPM), voxel-based morphometry (VBM) and dynamic causal modelling (DCM)... His main contribution to theoretical neurobiology is a free-energy principle for action and perception (active inference).
Truly. One of Friston's most recent papers, which impressed Prof. Davey enough to pen his lengthy paean, is titled Computational psychiatry: from synapses to sentience. Now that would seem to fit the bill, a theoretical bridge across the gap between mind and body, allowing psychiatry to scoop up both the biological science of mental disorder, and the human side of suffering ... But hang on, isn't that familiar? Yes, it's that same old mind-body problem that caused René Descartes so much trouble nearly four hundred years ago. So the energetic Dr Friston has solved it, has he? A bridge to join the brain's synapses, the junctions between nerves, and our sense of being living critters? Wow, just what the doctor ordered. And just what the RANZCP desperately needs if they want to avoid the charge of wilfully misleading everybody (including themselves) over the phantom BPS model. Why don't we call it "Biopsychosocial model 2.0"? But wait: Spanish philosopher George Santayana said, “Those who don't remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” Because we've been here before.
In 1977, a gastroenterologist in Rochester, NY, announced that the practice of medicine was becoming inhumane: "The dominant model of disease today is biomedical, and it leaves no room within its framework for the social, psychological and behavioral dimensions of illness" [7]. Patients were no longer seen as sentient beings suspended in a web of social contacts but as lumps of biological material to be poked, prodded and jabbed. George Engel, who died in 1998, issued a challenge to mainstream medicine to get to work on an integrative model of mind and body: "A biopsychosocial model is proposed that provides a blueprint for research, a framework for teaching, and a design for action in the real world of health care."
Engel suggested a novel scientific model, General Systems Theory (GST), written by an Austrian-born biologist, Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1901-1972), could do the job. If we look at mind and body as a system, he said, then we can use von Bertalanffy's model to bridge the gap. Or so he thought. Von Bertalanffy's book from 1968, simply called General Systems Theory [8], is heavy on maths and, if Engel had read it, he didn't realise that it only works on physical or matter-energy systems, like a car engine. The core of GST is a concept called the "matter-energy transfer function" and, as its name suggests, it can't apply to a matter-information system, like the mind-brain system. Oh dear, back to the drawing board. In any event, Engel didn't actually write his model, he simply proposed it and left the details to somebody else, although they didn't know where to start (and the RANZCP still has no idea).
Oddly enough, and even though Engel didn't think much of psychiatrists, his model has been taken up by psychiatry, see the quote from the worthy Dr Moore above. But it's slowly dawning on people that it isn't working, that fifty years of promises haven't, in Thomas Insel's words, "... moved the needle in reducing suicide, reducing hospitalisations, improving recovery for the tens of millions of people who have mental illness" [3]. Engel's biopsychosocial model has well and truly reached its use-by date but here we are, fifty years and billions of dollars after Engel, gripped by the same problem: is psychiatry meant to be treating humans or just brains? Echoing Engel, Prof. Davey is proposing that the latest, hot-off-the-press scientific model (inference modelling in the computational brain) will get psychiatry out of its sticky spot. And, like Engel, he hasn't actually looked at the details, because that's where devils like to hide.
Friston's papers are more than just "heavy on mathematics," that's what they are. However, they still have to solve the problems Descartes couldn't resolve, of how mind and brain interact. Unfortunately for Davey's hopes, they don't explain how sentience emerges from the brain. Friston talks endlessly about decision-making, as though that's all there is to the human experience, but that's what philosopher David Chalmers called "the easy problem of consciousness." The hard problem, the nature of experience and how it arises in the physical brain, is simply overlooked, drowned by the flood of babble about entropy and so on. The reason is perfectly clear: just as Engel couldn't resolve the matter-energy transfer functions for the brain, Friston doesn't have a theory of information to bridge the gap in the matter-information system called the mind-brain. Damn.
We'll have to leave this jolly little story now but the problem is two-fold. First, psychiatry wants to be seen as a "medical science," so it can't take the mental side of "mental disorder" seriously. However, it won't go away, which is why we get these cycles of well-meaning people saying "Psychiatry has become dehumanising, we need to fix this." The second problem is that they then try to use a non-mentalist theory to give an account of mental life. That's like trying to use the theory of road transport to solve the problem of heavier-than-air flight, or using Pasteur's germ theory to solve the problem of alcoholism (and yes, I know they've tried and failed). The principle is simple: you cannot use a non-mentalist theory to give an account of mentalism. But that's what happens when people don't understand their history, they keep repeating it.
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References:
1. McLaren N (2013). Psychiatry as Ideology. Ethical Human Psychology and Psychiatry 15: 7-18.
2. Stoljar D (2010). Physicalism. Oxford: Routledge.
3. Rogers A (2017). Star Neuroscientist Tom Insel Leaves the Google-Spawned Verily for ... a Startup? Wired Science May 11 2017. https://www.wired.com/2017/05/star-neuroscientist-tom-insel-leaves-google-spawned-verily-startup/
4. Frankfurt H (1986). On Bullshit. Raritan Quarterly Review 6 (2): 81–100. (Fall 1986).
5. Davey CG (2024). Understanding and explaining depression: From Karl Jaspers to Karl Friston. Australian & New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 2024, Vol. 58(1) 5–9.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0004867423121917.
6. Friston K (2022). Computational psychiatry: from synapses to sentience. Molecular Psychiatry 28:256–268; https://doi.org/10.1038/s41380-022-01743-z.
7. Engel GL (1977). The need for a new medical model: a challenge for biomedicine. Science; 196:129-136.
8. Bertalanffy L von (1968/1969). General Systems Theory. NY: Braziller/Penguin.
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This material is copyright but can be copied or quoted on condition the author is acknowledged.
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Abbreviations:
OPCAT: Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture
NIMH: National Institute for Mental Health, Bethesda, Maryland, USA.
RANZCP: Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists
RCPsych: Royal College of Psychiatry (UK).
UNCAG: UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
UNCAT: UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
UNCRPD, or just CRPD: UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
WHO: World Health Organisation.

Was the paper just complete hogwash? I mean, even if "free energy" (whatever the hell that is) does not solve the problem, I wonder if it is a valid concept in terms of physics/mathematics?
A lot of these sort of statisticians drive funding, "theory" and culture for many psychology/brain departments at universities I feel (I'm doing research in one currently-I'm not brain zapping but largely pointless experimental psychology). The departments love to tout the idea of being open to new ideas but at the end of the day, the machines and funding the departments get so new papers with stylish graphs can be produced seem to always depend on the premise that this will help us unlock the secrets of the brain or something (even if not openly conveyed, the idea that brain is everything seems permanently ingrained), and usually the professor who knows the most maths is at the heart of it all.
A couple of FMRI (where voxel-based morphometry is used I think) findings have been interesting in vegetative state patients, but you're never going to see thoughts, feelings and emotions in a brain scan or statistical equation right?
Brilliant.