Nature vs Nurture

Again. Still.

These posts examine modern psychiatry from a critical point of view. Unfortunately, mainstream psychiatrists usually react badly to any sort of critical analysis of their activities, labelling critics as “anti-psychiatry,” whatever that is. Regardless, criticism is an integral part of any scientific field and psychiatry is no different. As it emerges, there is a lot to be critical about.

If you like what you read, please click the “like” button at the bottom of the text, it helps spread the posts to new readers. If you want to comment, please use the link at the end rather than email me as they get lost and nobody sees them.

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A paper published a few months ago tell us: “Crystallized and fluid cognitive abilities have different genetic associations with neuropsychiatric disorders”[1]. As soon as you see the words ‘genetic’ and ‘psychiatry’ in a title, you know what you’ll be getting: an impenetrable mix of genetic jargon and mind-numbing statistics that proves, at great public expense, just what the authors wanted to find. True to form, the authors use a variety of genetic databases where the subjects have completed different psychological tests to see if there is a link between how people perform on those tests and their psychiatric diagnoses, although they admitted they weren’t sure what they had found.

In fact, almost from the time the first tests were developed by Darwin’s cousin, Francis Galton (1822-1911) in the 1860s, psychiatrists have been fascinated by the idea that mental disorder and intellect are related. Galton’s starting point, heavily influenced by Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859), is that practically everything important about humans is genetic. His interest was almost at the level of an obsession and he studied everything available at the time, such as height, facial appearance and, of course intelligence. This quickly led him to the idea that it would be possible to breed better humans than were generally available at the time, a concept he named as ‘eugenics.’ Very quickly, upper class and educated people throughout Europe and America adopted this as an article of faith: by selective breeding, unfavourable traits could be eliminated from the population. This meant “controlled breeding,” which sequed smoothly to the next step, “elimination of defective humans from the population to build a superior human race.” They used themselves as the model of “superior human beings.”

These days, the idea of eugenics is seen as completely distasteful, fit only for cranks and monsters, but that’s recent as everybody tries to distance themselves from the Nazi application of eugenics. A hundred years ago, eugenics was absolutely mainstream thinking among the intelligentsia, especially in the US where several states had eugenic laws. However, most of the actual research on hereditary illness was done in Germany, even before the Nazis came to power in 1933, because German science was generally seen as the best in the world. Anybody who wanted to study any aspect of human genetics had to go to Germany, and many did. After 1933, floods of money were provided for Nazi Rassenhygiene or “race science” to “prove” that the Aryan (Nordic) races were superior. The corollary, of course, was that everybody else was inferior and psychiatry was right at the centre of it. The virulently antisemitic Henry Ford strongly supported eugenics, including donations to the Nazi race science centre, and in 1938 was awarded Nazi Germany’s Grand Cross of the German Eagle, a medal given to foreigners sympathetic to Nazism

Prior to the outbreak of war, numbers of young psychiatrists travelled to study under the director of the psychiatric laboratories, Ernst Rüdin. One of Rüdin’s most prominent students was a Dr Eliot Slater, from Britain, who served as editor of the British Journal of Psychiatry from 1961-72 and reoriented it toward a strict biological and genetic approach. Rüdin later began the program to sterilise or murder psychiatric patients. Initially, they used injections but this was slow and unpleasant for the staff so they quickly settled on carbon monoxide gassing. This became the basis of the vast industrialised murder of millions on “eugenic principles,” including Jewish people, the Romany, Slavs, criminals, homosexuals and anybody else they didn’t like. Of course, nobody talks about that history these days, modern psychiatry is concerned with the dispassionate application of scientific principles to discovering the cause of mental disorder, as long as it’s genetic. This paper is a perfect example of how genetic research in psychiatry is never wrong. Until somebody tries to replicate it, of course, then it’s quickly forgotten. The point is that as long as people are determined to prove that all mental disorder is biological, genetics is a fundamental part of their campaign, so its history has to be whitewashed.

Back to the paper: what do they mean, crystallised and fluid intelligence? Isn’t there only one kind, the smart kind? This is an ancient argument, familiar to Galton 150yrs ago, and to every culture on earth. It’s clear that some people are good at some things and not so good at others, that education gives people more to work with, that some problem-solving abilities improve with age and some decline, and that people with mental troubles don’t do very well on testing. Crystallised and fluid intelligence refer to different aspects of intellect, not to totally different concepts. Fluid means the ability to solve problems in the here and now, such as matching pictures, completing sequences and so on. Crystallised refers to problem solving that relies on old learned material, be it education, culture, life experience etc. To me, these terms are a distinction without a difference, about as important as the physiological difference between lifting a bag of cement and lifting an egg: the difference tells us nothing about the actual neuromuscular machinery involved.

The paper looks at cognitive differences between five conditions, attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), autism spectrum disorder (AUT), Alzheimer’s disease (ALZ), bipolar disorder (BIP), and schizophrenia (SCZ). I have no idea why they consider Alzheimer’s a psychiatric condition but the weasel prefix “neuro-” fixes that to their satisfaction. Their goal was to try to explain the enigma of mental disorder in evolutionary terms: because it’s genetic and detrimental to survival and breeding, why does mental disorder persist in the population? Surely it should die out naturally? There are different approaches to take. Huntington’s disease, for example, normally doesn’t become manifest until the early 40s, by which time the sufferers have already had their children and thus passed it on. However, that’s been known as a genetic disease forever as it matches the Mendelian model of genetic transmission. Most emphatically, mental disorder does not, but geneticists have an answer for that, which we’ll come to. After pages of tangled syntax and jargon, the authors announced:

An additional set of SNPs is in an intergenic region on chromosome 11, between genes RPL12P46 and LINC02698, previously only associated with heel bone mineral density... A study of rare protein-coding variation in relation to verbal-numerical reasoning in the UKB also identified a genetic locus (KDM5B) with pleiotropic associations with bone mineral density, and KDM5B mutant mice showed both cognitive deficits and skeletal abnormalities [1, p4; ‘pleiotropic’ means a single gene or defect affects a range of traits, leading to a complex clinical picture].

Bone mineral density. Mutant mice. Human intelligence. Right. True to form, they continue:

The candidate SNP rs35225412, mapped to the intergenic region between the genes C2orf73 and SPTBN1 on chromosome 2, has not been associated with any trait previously, whereas the SNPs found in the intergenic region 7:114337615-114428727, near the FOXP2 gene, have been associated previously with body mass index, Crohn’s disease, antisocial behavior and general risk tolerance [1, p4].

As an aside, the FOXP2 gene was previously thought to be “the language gene,” which it isn’t, and appears to have misled Chomsky to make his absurd claim that human language evolved abruptly 75,000 years ago after a single minor mutation, for which he provided exactly zero evidence: see [2, Chap. 7; Homo sapiens appeared about 300,000 years ago]. Another gene that caught their attention was C2orf73, of which a recent review commented: “– none of these reports provide functional insights into the role of the gene C2orf73 ... the biological function of C2orf73 remains uncharacterized in this body of literature.” That is, we don’t have a clue. As expected, the study authors were undeterred by this pessimism: “Further functional studies will be necessary to clarify whether C2orf73 has a role in any of these pathological processes or represents a disease‐irrelevant locus” [1, p4, added emphasis; it is a given in genetics that all papers must end with a call for more research]. You get the message.

Genetic research in mental disorder is ancient, it has always been there; it has a truly horrendous history which mainstream psychiatry ignores. As an example, the current editor of Psychological Medicine is a Prof. Kenneth Kendler of Virginia Commonwealth University, a geneticist and one of the most widely cited psychiatrists in the world. He was closely associated with Eliot Slater and many other British geneticists; in the 1990s, he teamed up with Ernst Rüdin’s daughter, Edith, herself a psychiatric geneticist, to try to rehabilitate her father’s name but it didn’t end well. Rüdin vater was up to his ears in mass murder so, amazingly, she takes over his trade (I’m not making this up: see Wiki entry on Rüdin above, last paragraph).

Second point: there is absolutely no justification anywhere in the psychiatric literature, or psychological, or neurosciences, or philosophy, that allows anybody to state that mental disorder is genetic in origin [2, Chap.2]. It is today wholly an ideology as it was in the Nazis’ day. They believed in a hierarchy of races and decided to put their belief into practice. They believed that intellect is inherited, that some forms are better than others, so the idea that mental disorders are in some sense an offshoot of different forms of intellect is a direct descendent of that idea. But just as the ideal of a superior race has led us to genocide, so the idea of “genetic mental disorders” has led us to believe that pills are the answer for everything. Yesterday, a colleague sent around a link to a study which gave the drug mebufotenin to ten women with post-partum depression. This is inhaled for a few minutes each day for a week, after which they were reported as improved. Bufotenin is cane toad toxin. There was no exploration of the possible psychological or other reasons (e.g. family or money worries, sleep deprivation etc) that contribute to distress after delivery and no indication of whether the “improvement” was sustained. Being told “It’s all chemical imbalances, dear,” disempowers people from dealing with real problems in their lives.

Third point goes back to the fact that mental disorder doesn’t match any known genetic models, but geneticists have an answer for that. Whenever a new study comes up empty-handed, meaning all the time, they simply do what philosopher of science Karl Popper called “immunising their theory against refutation.” First, they tried to show mental disorder flowed through affected families. Another of Rüdin’s students was a German psychiatrist, Franz Kallman, who, because he was Jewish, went to the US where he immediately began the same sort of program on the genetics of mental disorder. He continued publishing on genetics long after it was clear that his former teachers had been convicted for what they did in Germany. He convinced a lot of people that schizophrenia followed a simple genetic model, since completely debunked. Then they moved to the polygenic or multifactorial “model,” the idea that lots of genes contribute to the clinical picture.

That has become immeasurably complicated and has gone nowhere. Pleiotropy is just the latest cab off the rank, the idea that a single genetic defect can have far-reaching effects throughout the body. The usual model is Marfan’s syndrome, in which a defect in connective tissue affects the heart and aorta, eyes, bones, joints and so on. Another is Kartagener’s syndrome, a rare condition in which the body’s cilia, the tiny hair-like coverings of certain cells, are unable to beat properly. This affects the respiratory tract and other organs, including the little tails on sperm, so affected males are sterile. One defect produces a host of complications, eventually fatal. For psychiatry, this has gone nowhere but, as the paper above shows, they’re undeterred. There are lots of genes and even more “junk DNA” (it probably isn’t) so they should be able to extract decades of research money from this idea. Question remains: Why bother?

There’s an important principle in philosophy of science called Occam’s razor, one version of which says that the simplest model that does the job is to be preferred. Despite the blizzards of publicity given to the idea that all mental disorder is biological, this remains an opinion, nothing more. The alternative is that mental disorder is psychological in nature, that what we believe and experience can push us over the edge. If that happens, some people manage to get back on the level while others get trapped in self-sustaining, destructive mental loops. The biological people say that we are not to talk about mental stuff because it’s dualism, meaning unreal or fantasy or just plain nonsense, indistinguishable from talk about witches and magic spells.

The biological opinion, that mental problems have physical causes, goes back a long way, probably as long as there have been humans. Its most common form is the idea that there is something you can add to or subtract from the diet that will cure all manner of ailments and woes. The modern, antidualist version simply builds on that tradition but it has no more basis in fact than the Romans buying herbs and poultices in the market to cure their miseries over the fall of the empire. Today’s antipathy comes from misreading the doctrine of positivism, which says that if we can’t see it or measure it, science can’t talk about it. We can’t see or measure the mind, therefore science can’t talk about it. That’s all it says. It does NOT say that if we can’t see it or measure it, it doesn’t exist, which is what biological psychiatry assumes.

The psychological model says mental problems have mental causes but, because so much time and energy and money is committed to the biological side, psychological approaches have been starved of resources to the point where there is practically no significant research being done. There’s no field research because there’s no model, and there’s no model because “they” (the psychiatrists who control the flow of money) say it’s impossible to talk about the mind. Impasse. But let’s look at it objectively. The idea that our genes can somehow determine what we feel or believe goes nowhere. Yes, our capacity for speech is genetic but the language we speak and what we will say or believe in that language has no basis in biology: what’s the possible mechanism? We’re not talking about defects in fibrillin in connective tissue that can be assayed and seen under an electron microscope. Same goes for our emotions: the capacity to become panicky on perceiving a threat or to become low and miserable after experiencing a loss are genetic, but what we experience and when it happens is psychological. After a tortuous journey through some arcane statistics, the paper concluded:

The heterogeneous associations between cognitive factors and neuropsychiatric disorders may further help illuminate the evolutionary paradox of why common genetic variants that increase risk for psychiatric disorders persist in human populations despite negative selection (p10) ... In conclusion, our multidimensional approach to cognitive function and its genetic underpinnings provides nuanced insights into the shared genetic architecture between cognitive abilities and neuropsychiatric disorders. Results underscore that cognitive function is a multidimensional system of traits (p12).

In other words, we haven’t moved the needle one little bit, it’s all too complicated but please send more money and we’ll see how we can spend it. One example of why they made no progress is the post-partum depression paper: women who become weepy and miserable after childbirth are not biologically ill, even though there are lots of biological things going on for the first week or two. They’re reacting to a major event within the constraints of their family, their culture and their personal expectations. This has to be explored carefully to tease out the different contributing factors rather than just blowing powdered toads up their noses, as the colleague commented:

How ridiculous, is this going to help women with postnatal depression which would be caused by suddenly being stuck at home with a small creature which cries a lot, day and night, with very little social support, and sudden dramatic drop in social status if previously in workplace.... never mind any relationship issues, if the mother even has a partner...?

I couldn’t agree more. Compared with the mental gymnastics of the biological “model,” the idea that mental events have mental causes is simplicity itself, and leads directly to a form of treatment:

“So you feel you’re not coping as a mother, and all your friends are telling you to pull yourself together and stop pampering the baby but you’re scared you’ll ruin him for life like your cousin was ruined...? Can you talk about that?”

I can tell you now which version Bishop William of Ockham, from the 14^th Century, would have chosen. But let’s go back to the genetics paper, which asked why mental disorders persist against evolutionary pressure. Because it’s not genetic, dumbo, it’s psychological, and psychology has nothing to do with genetics.

References:

1. Londono-Correa D et al (2026) Crystallized and fluid cognitive abilities have different genetic associations with neuropsychiatric disorders. Nature Communications online 30.04.2026. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-026-72477-7.

2. McLaren N (2024). Theories in Psychiatry: building a post-positivist psychiatry. Ann Arbor, MI: Future Psychiatry Press. Amazon.

Also look at Peter Gotzsche’s recent book: Is psychiatry a crime against humanity?

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My critical works are best approached in this order:

The case against mainstream psychiatry:

McLaren N (2024). Theories in Psychiatry: building a post-positivist psychiatry. Ann Arbor, MI: Future Psychiatry Press. Amazon (this also covers a range of modern philosophers, showing that their work cannot be extended to account for mental disorder).

Development and justification of the biocognitive model:

McLaren N (2021): Natural Dualism and Mental Disorder: The biocognitive model for psychiatry. London, Routledge. At Amazon.

Clinical application of the biocognitive model:

McLaren N (2018). Anxiety: The Inside Story. Ann Arbor, MI: Future Psychiatry Press. At Amazon.

Testing the biocognitive model in an unrelated field:

McLaren N (2023): Narcisso-Fascism: The psychopathology of right wing extremism. Ann Arbor, MI: Future Psychiatry Press. At Amazon.

The whole of this work is copyright but may be copied or retransmitted provided the author is acknowledged.